Modern digital infrastructure, including energy grids, telecommunications networks, and stock markets, relies heavily on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for ultra-accurate time synchronisation. However, this reliance creates a critical vulnerability to signal jamming and spoofing attacks, which can disrupt services and manipulate location and timing data. Harald Hauglin and fellow researchers at the annual Jammertest event in Norway simulate advanced cyber and signal attacks to test how commercial receivers and critical systems withstand artificial interference. These open events foster resilience by sharing vulnerabilities and testing backup systems against potential strategic threats. The primary threats involve extended jamming that exhausts backup timing mechanisms and slow-burn spoofing attacks that deceive systems without triggering alerts. Mitigating these risks requires combining satellite navigation with land-based atomic clocks, fibre-optic cables, and advanced timing frameworks like CERN's White Rabbit. Governments and critical industries must proactively invest in diverse, resilient timing and navigation architectures to prevent widespread digital disruption. Enhancing security against space-based interference and maintaining rigorous testing protocols remain essential strategies for protecting modern infrastructure.
